UK Energy Security: Geopolitics and Supply Risks | Henning Gloystein

All right, good afternoon, thank you Montel again for being here, it's always a pleasure, my name is Henning Glorstein, I'm the Managing Director for Energy and Resources at Eurasia Group, where we do geopolitical analysis and advisory, so my main news today is a love affair that is really impacting stuff in terms of geopolitics, that's not my love affair, where are we going to go? Right, here we go, so no, I mean, quite seriously, this is not, normally we, and I will go into more detail about Iran, Ukraine and that sort of geopolitics, but this Jensen 1 affair really has some spice in it, because I saw overnight, early this morning, the first estimates, it looks like anywhere between 50,000 and 100,000 high-end and video chips are missing, so that is going to turn into a geopolitical story, I'm pretty sure, NVIDIA was sued overnight by a big group in California, so more to come on that, but I actually don't know any details, so, but watch those headlines, I'm going to talk about geopolitics in terms of supply chain disruptions, you can see here, that's not the Strait of Hormuz, that is the Red Sea, that's the UNOVOR, European Union scheme to protect ships there, that photo was taken yesterday and published, so it goes to show that this is really a feisty market still going on. At Eurasia Group, we put the world into some geopolitical buckets, you know, one, everything's going to be fantastic, one, things might get a bit better, the other one, things are a bit rubbish, and the other one is really scary. Unfortunately, we do this up to 10 years out, but no one cares about that, in this room, at least probably not, we, for the next six months to 12 months, we see ourselves firmly in the geopolitical recession, what we mean by that is, politics, globally, is having a negative impact on most national economics, you know, debt levels are too high, inflation is too high, because of debt levels and interest rates, and energy costs, of course, that's a big one, tariffs are too high, tariffs are too high, political cooperation isn't good enough, and conflict is still simmering anywhere. Now, of course, you could say, like, we're in a geopolitical crisis right now, we don't think so, in that sense that it's not, on a global scale, bad enough yet. So, for us to see that sort of bad outcome, we would probably need to see a global recession and possibly a conflict, a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific, something like Taiwan happening, which at the moment we don't think is going to happen. So, we're in the second worst, slightly rubbish scenario, where our outlook is third powers, India, Europe, Japan, really struggle to growth because of high trade barriers, high inflation, populism flourishes in this environment, high costs of living pressure, stop-and-go trade, stagflationary macroeconomics, all bad words, low liquids growth, and high counterparty risk. You know, about a third of the world's VLCCs is in the shadow fleet right now, and the other two-thirds gets shot at all the time. So, this is a complicated world, and it is corrosive, and that's our worry, that the longer we stay in this sort of scenario, it's quite corrosive for global economies, especially trade-dependent economies like Europe's, like India's, like Japan's. We rely on seamless shipping of goods, export manufactured goods, import liquids, and that's not really functioning at the moment, and here's why. So, you can see left here, that's the UK maritime trade operations. I'm sure many of you see this. It's updated daily in public. They communicate naval security around the Arabian Peninsula. That is a screenshot of yesterday. That is the Strait of Hormuz, but that's, more specifically, the Omanian coast of the Strait of Hormuz. Those are the locations of all successful attacks against civilian vessels since October 1st. So, you can see it is littered. That is the passage of safe transit that the U.S. Navy communicates. I don't call that safe. I'm on naval calls with the Joint Maritime Information Center almost every day. They said this morning, at 6 a.m., they were saying overnight, at least 20 mines were catapulted into the Straits, into Omani waters by Iran. They do this every night. Those are drifting mines. And then they just lift, let the currents, they go from northwest to southeast, take those drifting mines into those Omani waters and see what happens. So, that's 20 a night. During the day, the Iranians currently, so yesterday, they shot 40-something missiles or drones from onshore Iran across the strait. Those include supersonic short-range missiles. They're light, so they don't sink ships, but they hit the engine rooms, and they're very difficult to intercept. So, that was 45 yesterday. So, again, that's the stuff that got hit. So, UKMTO publicly tells you what got hit, what hit the target, but they don't tell you what was intercepted or what missed. And the bad news is it's quite a lot. So, you can see here, in October, more than 40 successful ships were hit in the Strait of Hormuz, and since the start of November, updated yesterday, it was 10. So, you can see there that's quite intensive. That is not what the market seems to be thinking, that the Strait of Hormuz is open. It really isn't. And the number of attacks is going to increase. As I said, the mines are still there. Why is it going to increase? The Iranians think they're on the upper hand now. We all heard that over the last weekend, when a lot of people, including Eurasia Group, expected an attack to be imminent, it didn't happen. And then there was headlines of the Qataris saying, oh, they found a deal with the Iranians, and so forth. Maybe there will be deals, but at the moment, the Iranians, for them, this is a position of strength. They are not willing to compromise any further because they're getting away with it. And from the U.S. side, okay, at the moment, the U.S. cabinet is majority in favor of not escalating, but there is still a third carrier strike group arriving by the end of this week. They'll be in theater for about 10 days with all three carriers, and then they'll replace one. But there will be new kinetic military equipment going into the conflict zone. So our view now is that the Strait of Hormuz will remain contested. That doesn't mean that it's going to shut down again fully. The U.S. is putting a lot of effort into this, but we don't see this as a de-escalation. Also worth bearing in mind that this is no longer a conflict between the United States and Iran only. The Israelis have been on the sidelines of this all the time and sometimes more or less involved. Of course, Lebanon has been involved. But the Saudi situation with the Houthis is really quite serious. Bear in mind that there are now at least four NATO members involved in Saudi Arabia. Turkey has put air defense units around Riyadh Airport. The French military has put air defense units around Yanbu, oil terminal on the Red Sea. The British have moved a squadron of typhoons over. And the Greeks have two frigates in Saudi waters helping them. So this is not a conflict between the U.S. and Iran. It is a Middle East conflict, and it is one that is very hard to contain now because it has spread. And bear in mind that when the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia was taken out a few months ago, that actually came from Iraq. So, again, this is not a regional conflict. We shouldn't forget about this one, the Ukraine war. And the problem here is, of course, that there's also no real solution visible. We do not believe in a negotiated, credible ceasefire this winter. Why not? First of all, the deal that the United States is trying to persuade Ukraine to sign up to. In Ukraine's public, literally the overwhelming majority of Ukraine says that deal is so bad that we prefer to be at war for another winter. That's how bad that deal is for Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has realized that standing up to Putin, to Trump, and push back on him has made him more popular. So, they are pushing about 40,000 highly trained, super well-equipped soldiers to the front right now, and the Russians are pushing 100,000 to the front. So, there is no de-escalation on the ground. In fact, both sides are reinforcing their fronts. The casualties are insane. But this is not a de-escalation happening right now. And you can see at the top of this chart, there's sort of the level of intensity of fighting. For sure, there's been a little drop right now over the last couple of weeks, but that's because troops are moving. But if you see overall, since midpoint of this year, the level of fighting has been way higher than at any point since the start of this war. So, this is not de-escalating. And, of course, the Russians are escalating their asymmetric warfare across Europe. There's headlines almost every day. Ukrainians are hitting Russian refineries every day. No de-escalation. And, in fact, the Black Sea is now a more dangerous border than the Strait of Hormuz. So, more sailors have died in the Black Sea over the last three months than around the Arabian Peninsula. So, there's another border that's contested. And this is where it gets to energy. This chart was shown to me by a gentleman of Meti in Japan a few months ago who was about to retire. And he said, Henning-san, this is my career. And I said, okay, what's that? And he said, I started in the late 70s. And every decade something happens and Japan's oil and gas supply chains get disrupted because of bloody politics. And now I'm retiring and I don't want to see this chart ever again. It's literally what I said. And bear in mind sort of the Iranian revolution, Gulf War, oil price there of $40. If you inflation adjust that, that's more expensive than it was currently. So, this is where you can see that geopolitics, in terms of oil market disruption, is the single biggest price driver. And here's why. And here's why this year is so bad. So, if you take the Iran and the Middle East, sorry, the Ukraine and the Middle East conflicts together, and you look at the number of state -led attacks against merchant ships, 2026 already is worse than the last 35 years combined. In fact, the entire tanker wars of the early 1980s saw less attacks against tankers than we've seen this year. And they had a war named after them. So, this is a really bad situation. We all know most goods, LNG, crude oil, our phones, these clothes come on containers. And you can see what this is doing to the cost of shipping oil and containers around the world. They've grown absolutely bananas because a quarter of the world's tanker fleet is under the shadow fleet, so it's sanctioned, and the rest, like I said, is being attacked almost on a daily basis. And you don't need to sink them. You just need them repaired. There's only about 15 shipyards around the world at the moment that can take in VLCCs, so very large crude carriers, to be repaired. And I'm not a ship engineer, but I think repairing a 350-meter-long ship will take a while. So, this is why the situation is so tight. And then you've got this problem, and that's the choke points. So, the message here is that an abundance of oil and gas cannot protect importers from disruptions and price spikes. As we can see now, at the start of this conflict, mid-February 2022, oil and gas production sat above consumption, and it was the same in early 2022 as it is now, as it was this February in 2026. So, an abundance does not protect you. That's not really politics' fault. That's the Earth's fault. But we've got too many choke points. And the Strait of Hormuz is totally disrupted. The Strait of Malacca is okay at the moment. But unless you really think nothing is ever going to happen between China and Taiwan, you probably need to at least have plan B for that one. Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandab, is challenged at the moment. Panama Canal, nothing to do with politics, but the weather is resulting in a reduced volume through Panama. Also, bear in mind, President Donald Trump openly says that the Americans built the Panama Canal, so they should own it. So, who knows what will happen in the next two years. But this is the reality that importers from Japan to Europe face. I haven't even put in here the Bosporus and the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, where incidents happen. So, you could actually add these choke points further out to this screen. And that means that politicians need to do stuff, and companies. And so, there's three ways to deal with supply chain disruptions like LNG or oil. You can stock release, storage management, demand restrictions, and fuel switching. That's all been done, apart from the demand side restrictions, because government really don't want to tell industry to shut down, and normally the price does that anyway. But stock releases, we're in the middle of that. Storage management, fuel switching, it's all done. So, tick, we're going to the next one. Supply, diversification, storage, infrastructure investment is happening, but doesn't give you an overnight result. But this is all happening, so you sign a new contract with American LNG sellers, with Canada LNG, and so forth. You ask the Norwegians whether they have more through pipelines. Great, we can do that, and it's happening. But the next one, you have to move over, and that's electrification. We all know gas boiler replacements, battery storage systems, electrification of transport. That's happening, and it is accelerating, because all governments and companies are choosing the low-hanging fruit. What can we do fastest? The fastest thing is a boiler replacement program for households. The fastest is an EV subsidy. That has a fast impact on road transportation, fuel demand, and gas demand. And then, of course, battery storage system and the power system you develop as well. And there's incentives for all of this. So, this will accelerate through this crisis, because we're eight months into this crisis. And that means governments and companies can't wait for our call to be right, that the war will be over at some point. They just have to make new deals and make new decisions and invest. And as a result of this, what we think will happen is that, for instance, the Strait of Hummers, by the end of this decade, which is kind of soon, will lose half of its crude trade permanently. Now, LNG is a bit different, because, of course, Qatar can't build pipelines for its diversions. But the Emiratis, they will complete the doubling of their crude oil pipeline to Fujairah by January. It's in, like, two and a half months. They only started five months ago. The Saudis are also really quite fast. The Iraqis are building a pipeline across Syria to the Mediterranean, which will become operational at some point next year. Again, with gas, it will take a bit longer. But overall, this will have huge implications, because it's permanent change. And what this means is, for Europe, on the oil side, I think Europe will almost take no oil coming through the Strait of Hummers by 2030. They'll take it from Yambu, from Red Sea, from Fujairah, maybe. But they'll also be very reluctant to sign up for new LNG contracts, because we actually don't think, structurally, this conflict will resolve itself. There might be an end to fighting, but there's always a risk of flare-ups, because all the underlying issues of this conflict are being left unresolved by Trump, by the Iranians, by the Israelis, and anybody else who's involved, the Houthi and the Saudis. And this is what this looks like. So for natural gas, we think that once peace breaks out, this will take 24 to 48 months to fully resolve itself from Qatar. That is a huge disparity. We don't really know how long the Qatari sale will take, up to five years. I don't believe that, so we said four. But train one is probably destroyed entirely, and that will take forever to rebuild. So they will get gas out of the market, but to full return of where they thought they would be at this time this year without a war, that will take a very, very long time because of the rebuilding. And that means, and other products are a bit faster, but that means given how much conflict we've already seen, so eight months or so, you have to add that figure from the point where there's a ceasefire that allows for repairing on scale to happen. And that is the highlight, saying, like, well, if you hope that the war's going to be over at some point mid-next year, and then that takes that long to resolve itself, do you build a renewable plant plus a battery facility, or do you build a gas-fired power station that will come online in five years? Those are real decisions that are being made right now. And then I'll slowly end on that. Here's how you can see what the decisions are. You've got the digitalization and electrification. Those are mega trends. We didn't come up with that term, but it really is, because the digitalization and the electrification will happen whichever government is in power, and they feed off each other. So electrification gets smarter with digitalization, smart grids, smart meters, everything, and the digitalization obviously requires electricity, and they feed off the same supply chains, and they are not dependent on fossil fuels as much as the past was. And you see the cost curve, what's happening here. This will work, and this will create new realities that mean that hopefully when I speak here in a year or two, that we can talk less about shipping and more about sort of opportunities that actually create growth and better business. Because at the moment, you can see here, the geopolitical recession is corrosive. It feeds populism. An abundance of oil and gas doesn't shield you from disruption and high prices. And so the resolution to this is electrification and just invest into local solutions to hopefully avoid a third crisis like this, as we're now living through. Thank you very much. I think that's enough for directly after lunch on gloom and doom, so hopefully something better come soon. Henning, thank you very much indeed. Yeah, I mean, it's a pretty gloomy picture. Is there any good news out there? Yeah, I mean, things always go better. The Qataris, they are actively negotiating with the Iranians, with all the rest of the GCC to find a solution. They're actively excluding the U.S. from this process. They're saying, let's find something, maybe freedom of passage first, and then we can present that to the U.S., and then that convinces them not to lash out again. That might work. It's a novel approach. So, you know, that would be nice. The midterms last week, I mean, they were so overwhelming that, I mean, J.D. Vance, it took him 30 minutes to come out and say, we need to change our relationship to Israel, we need to change the end of war in Iran, and tariffs gone. It's, wow, a lot of change can happen, a lot of positivity can happen. So, yeah, I mean, let's hope for the best, but not plan for it. Absolutely. I mean, do you think, I mean, we've talked a lot about this, both on podcasts and in other conversations, Henning, but do you expect the Straits of Amuse to open anytime soon? I mean, they're porous now. I don't think they'll totally shut down. I don't think the Iranians have the ability to do that, especially with the U.S. with free carrier fleets there. But they're going to continue to sting the market, and that doesn't allow for full opening. But I really think, I mean, I was talking to Hain over there earlier about the oil and gas industry is amazing how they can respond to things. These pipelines are being built now that no one talked about just a year ago, and I don't know how much LNG is on the water now. I've heard different figures, but there's so much LNG coming to Europe this winter. So I don't think there'll be shortages. It's just how high and how low can prices go, how fast, which I guess. But we're going to continue in a sort of high-priced environment for the foreseeable months ahead, at least. Months, yeah, but how long? I don't know. I mean, if the winter is not too cold. I mean, the LNG figures, I really don't know how high they are, but I've heard anything from 10 million tons on the water to Europe to 15. Just this morning, there was a guy saying 15 million tons are shipping to Europe right now. That's a lot. That could have been. But I don't know whether that's true. But, yeah, low storage, cold weather. Yeah. Just an aside, Kenning, what did you make of this sort of Germany-Italy spat between the gas storage? What was your view there? Politics at its worst. Yeah. I mean, basically, Italy is prepared well. Inventories are full. They can be proud of that, I guess. The Germans decided to not do that, not pay for any price necessary. And, I mean, if it gets cold, Germany is going to pay a very high price to keep things going. They might actually spend a lot of money on Italian resales. I mean, Italy to Rotterdam isn't that far. So, I think it's totally useless talk. But, unfortunately, that is, I mean, that's a populist in power in Italy. And, in Germany, Friedrich Merz is not the most astute energy person either. Although, they both normally get on quite well. So, it's a bit unfortunate, I find. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, yeah. Any questions for Henning from the floor? At the back here. Ron. Please state your name and organization. Thank you. Hi. It's Olamide from the London Stock Exchange. What's your forecast for near return of transit through our moves? Is it in three months' time? Is it in six months' time? Is it in nine months' time? So, at the moment, the volumes that are going through right now seem, yeah, I can just about see you in the light, but... Yeah, thank you. At the moment, the volumes from all those naval briefings that they say, they're quite successful. So, despite that map that I showed, overall, out of the Middle East, as much crude oil is coming out as it was before the start of the war. The problem is LNG isn't coming out at volume because the Qataris, their facilities are damaged. But that's what they're working on. So, it's possible that more Qatari energy comes out quite soon, but it's an extremely high risk of being disrupted. Because of the drifting mines that I mentioned, we expect the Iranians to continue to shoot in, and the U.S. will have to intercept a lot of stuff. So, it's tense, but a lot is coming out. That's why we don't think there'll be real shortages this winter. Sorry, just to double up on the question. You said the Qataris is the problem. I guess my question is... Qataris have a problem at the moment, yeah, because their production is down. What's the difference in, like, them being able to get that much oil out and they can't get LNG out? So, your question about Qatari being the problem. So, Qatar has a problem that their LNG facility at Ras Lafanne has been severely damaged, and so they can't get back to normal production. Whereas in the crude oil side, the Saudis, the Emiratis, they're getting out as much as crude as they were before the start of the war. A, because they're shipping the tankers out, and B, they're building pipelines. They both already have pipeline outlets that avoid Strait of Hormuz. And so, the Qataris have the problem that without the Strait of Hormuz being somewhat open, they can't get anything out, and they've got damaged facilities, so they can't get production back to pre-war levels. We have to pass it on to other ones. Sorry, Olamidi, but... We can catch up as well. I'm here for the rest of the day. Hi, Henning. Wayne here, also from LSEG. Thanks for your insights. From my side, just, and I think you've kind of alluded to it, I personally think the market isn't pricing in the long-term impact of Hormuz, and will it ever return to what we saw pre-conflict? I personally don't think so, and you alluded to some parts of it in terms of premiums, risk premiums, alternative routes, etc. Do you ever see a return to pre-conflict Strait of Hormuz? No. Thank you. Look, we've got a few questions here. Hi, Callum from Shell. Do you think the current energy crisis shifts and incentivizes countries, particularly outside Europe, to expand coal capacity and nuclear capacity? Just looking at the benefits outside of the environmental of energy security and the pricing, which is much lower than gas, because we now start seeing countries such as the U.S. and Southeast Asia just basically prioritizing coal. In the Indo-Pacific, definitely. I mean, India, China, they're burning as much coal as you can. Japan is burning a lot. So, yeah, definitely. Even Europe might, if they have to, we can burn more. In the U.S., I don't really know because gas is still quite cheap there. So, but, yeah, I think short-term, it's, you know, it's a solution that a lot of governments are trying to use, which is, I find, unfortunate, but, I mean, you can't force them to say, like, oh, no, you've got to think about emissions right now. That doesn't work. On the nuclear side, there's, yeah, I mean, there's some announcements have been made on conventional plans to build out nuclear power that wouldn't have happened without this situation. So, in Europe, in China, in India, in the United States, of course, even Japan's thinking about doing new nukes now. So, yeah, I think there will be stuff happening, but, I mean, conventional nuclear power stations, the costs and the delays, I do not believe Poland will build six conventional reactors as they're planning. They're going to build two and then they're going to run out of patience and money. And France will no way build 15 reactors in 15 years. I mean, who came up with that plan? So, it's too expensive, takes too long, but SMRs will go ahead. That, I think, has real legs because, I mean, everyone's doing it. Canada, the US, China, Japan, South Korea, everyone in Britain. Here, Rolls Royce, the world market leader in this. So, that, I think, will happen, but that's more of a storage play, isn't it? But it's an interesting development that wouldn't have happened without these conflicts, definitely. We've got three more questions. If we can ask them and then put them to you, Henning. Sure. Thank you, Henning. Nikita Prevelshikov, S&P Global Energy. So, I was just following up on your midterm point. I was wondering what's your view on, you know, Trump's escalation in the US-run war following the midterms? Is he going to be more emboldened because of the losses or would it be, you know, caution and pressure to dial down? That's question one and there's two here. Yeah, Henning, thank you. Very insightful. I was just wondering, as it's UK Energy Day on a purely selfish tack here, I just wondered what you thought of the prospects for UK energy prices given that you said even if the war ends tomorrow, I think you said it's 24 to 48 months that, you know, LNG will start flowing again properly through the Strait of Hormuz. So I just wondered what impact that would have specifically on UK energy prices. Thank you. Then there's one other question here. Was that? Yeah. Another question? You can have one. Yeah. Gabriel Orkicardi, also from S&P Global Energy. I wanted to test with you a little bit this line of argumentation of eventually having a reshiftive of the LNG geopolitics and eventually seeing the United States as some mega big position of supplier at a global scale and probably replacing, for instance, the damage that happened in the capacity of Qatar. Do you think that an eventual perpetuation of the war might benefit the United States because they might be getting higher prices that they are selling to Europe and other consumers internationally? Okay. So... Questions on the US and UK for you, Henning. Yes. So remind me again, what was the first first? On the midterms, the impact. Midterms, yes, thank you. Midterms, UK, US. So midterms, yeah, they definitely changed impact. I mean, last Friday, CENTCOM, the US Central Command, put out a warning of evacuation of non-essential staff, Doha, in Bahrain and Abu Dhabi and it advised civilian aviation to not fly over Iraq. So CENTCOM was fully ready and then what appears to have happened is that J.D. Vance got the better of Trump saying like, hey, with this midterms, you can't do that. You need to just at least wait and possibly wait until that third carrier strike group is there as well and so it looks like they got the better of him and then on Sunday night CENTCOM stood down. So that seemed, and they haven't stood up since, at least since I last watched this morning. So there's not going to be an escalation in the next couple of days. Trump said overnight it's very unlikely we'll escalate but we're, I think he said, ready and loaded. The problem is with this standoff that it's unbalanced. So the Iranians are going to try and keep stinging. If a big tanker gets hit or something really bad happens or maybe the Iranians get a missile through into a US naval asset, you're going to see an immediate response and if the US does sort of clandestine strikes on Iran, the Iranians will respond and so that means that we don't really think it's balanced whatever the midterms outcome was and foreign policy in the US it's executive policy so he can do that. The one thing to watch out for is that US Congress has budget power from January. That'll change. So at the moment it's all financed until January but from January things start wobbling a little bit but we're not quite there yet. So that's why we think midterms led to a de-escalation briefly now but there's a high risk of this derailing again and that's why I'm not fully bought into everything that's going to be sailing smoothly through almost not yet. Which to the UK not yet. We have a big dependency on Qatar here. UK gas storages are a joke so if spot prices I mean if they go up everything goes up and if they go down they'll come off but UK I mean has at the moment the one I think for Britain that's really interesting to watch out for is this political move which from next year might happen is to move most gas units out of the marginal pricing system introduce these legacy assets into CFDs and PPAs and then have a gas market and then I don't know what then I think there'll be come next year pretty strong wholesale price implications for that everything will go short term it'll be basically battery storage play interconnected play and so forth and weather this winter of course is we're at the mercy of all sorts of stuff Strait of Hormuz the Russians cyber attacks I mean I can't forecast what's going to happen there but the UK is exposed all of Northwest Europe in our view is most exposed to the fallout of the geopolitical aspects to this so Ukraine and how Russia responds Middle East Hormuz and then the weather so risky and oh yes back there yeah yeah yeah no I was just still thinking about response so I was still half thinking about Britain I mean the US I mean look at quarterly profits in Chevron it's absolutely bananas what's happened there and Qatar has just become the biggest buyer of US LNG in the world I mean goodness me and we've built a huge LNG import dependency on the United States for the next whatever decade or so at least so they're going to benefit they don't admit it but it's a bit like Norway can't benefit it's like yeah this is amazing and so it isn't but I mean the revenue the gas has to come from there the Germans have just tendered 10 gigawatts of gas-fired power stations will come they're going to put out another I think 6 or 7 so there'll be 16 gigs that need gas and that's going to come from the US and or Norway so yeah the US looks good and this Chris Wright loves it I mean energy dominance he's written it the US also now in oil they control probably 16 to 17 million barrels per day of crude oil production 14 million domestic Guyana is largely American and now whatever Venezuela can produce that's that's energy dominance Henning perfect I think if you have any questions for Henning please feel free to approach him in the breaks but again fantastic Henning thank you for for taking so many questions as well thank you I'm here all day here's a little present from us alright thank you